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Non-Technical Summary
Already today, the trade between affiliated companies is assessed to average out at more than
60 percent of the world trade. As this figure is supposed to further increase, the organisational form
of affiliated groups becomes even more important. The increased use of information and
communication technologies (ICT) leads to different changes within the organisational structures of
groups of companies. First of all, an increase in the number of intragroup cross-border transactions
can be observed. Besides, the products transferred or services rendered as well as the organisational
structures of affiliated groups become more and more specific and, thus, less comparable.
Furthermore, the importance of human capital and of mobile factors of production, such as
intangible assets, increases. In addition, different hybrid forms of enterprise co-operation emerge.
The contribution of each entity to the value added is often hard to identify. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the consequences resulting from these economic changes
on the allocation of profits within a group of companies. In a first step, it is analysed to what extent
the currently valid methods of transfer pricing which are based on the arm’s length principle are still
applicable. These traditional transaction-based methods determine a transfer price for each
intragroup transaction by comparing it to a comparable transaction taking place between third
parties. In a second step, possible adjustments of the traditional transfer pricing methods,
transactional profit methods as well as the alternative approach of formula apportionment are
assessed regarding their suitability. According to the method of formula apportionment, the overall
profits of a group of companies are allocated on the basis of a predetermined formula consisting of
several value creating factors. In order to assess the different methods of profit allocation, the tax
principles of inter-nation equity and feasibility serve as evaluation criteria. 
We conclude that, in the light of the evaluation criteria, the method of formula apportionment is
more appropriate than the arm’s length principle as regards the economic structures changed by the
use of ICT. This is due to the fact that the transfer pricing methods based on the arm’s length
principle seem to be less feasible, as comparable transactions often do not exist or are hard to
identify. Besides, the arm’s length principle can less often ensure an allocation of profits that is
consistent with inter-nation equity, whereas the method of formula apportionment can better cope
with this tax principle. In case of implementing a system of formula apportionment, the allocation
formula shall include payroll and intangible property, provided that the latter can be evaluated and
identified in practice. The method of formula apportionment constitutes a suitable alternative
especially for company taxation in the European Union. Therefore, the proposals made by the
European Commission regarding the method of formula apportionment are considered to be a good
starting point.
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Abstract
The use of information and communication technologies (ICT) within multinational groups leads to
a rising number of intragroup cross-border transactions. At the same time, transactions and the
organisational structures of affiliated groups become more and more specific and, thus, less
comparable. The importance of human capital and of mobile factors of production, such as
intangible assets, increases. The objective of this paper is to give an insight into the principal issues
of profit allocation within multinational groups resulting from these economic changes. It is
examined whether the traditional transaction methods based on the arm’s length principle can be
upheld and to what extent the alternative method of formula apportionment is more suitable. The
tax principles of inter-nation equity and feasibility are used to evaluate the different methods of
profit allocation. We conclude that, in the light of the two demanded principles, formula
apportionment is more appropriate than the arm’s length principle as regards the changed economic
structures by use of ICT. As formula apportionment constitutes a suitable alternative especially in
the European Union, the proposals made by the European Commission are considered to be a good
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11. Introduction
The trade between affiliated companies is assessed to average out at more than
60 percent of the world trade1 and the amount of cross-border intragroup trade is
expected to further increase in future years. Thus, the issues of international
transfer pricing and profit allocation within economic entities, such as groups of
companies, are already today one of the most frequently discussed matters in
international taxation and are supposed to become more important. 
The use of information and communication technologies (ICT) within groups of
companies leads to noticeable changes of their organisational structures which
also have an impact on the suitability of the methods of profit allocation. First of
all, the products transferred or services rendered between affiliated companies as
well as the organisational structures of groups of companies become more and
more specific and, thus, less comparable. Besides, the importance of human
capital and of mobile factors of production, such as intangible assets, increases.
In addition, the conventional value added chains turn into value added networks
with the contribution of each partner tending to be small and hard to identify.
Furthermore, the companies’ boundaries are blurring, as the creation of hybrid
forms of enterprise co-operation becomes more frequent.
In order to allocate profits between different tax subjects belonging to a
multinational group of companies and, thus, between different jurisdictions, the
taxable base of each tax subject has to be determined. According to the current
system of international company taxation, the arm’s length principle in
combination with the separate entity approach constitutes the prevalent method
to allocate profits between different taxable entities. Pursuant to this approach, a
transfer price for each separate intragroup transaction is determined on the basis
of comparative data. The relevant benchmark consists of comparable
transactions that are carried out on an arm’s length basis. Besides, an alternative
method to allocate profits between different taxable entities is the formula
apportionment in combination with the unitary method. According to this
approach, the entire economic entity is considered a single entity. Thus, profits
are determined at the level of the economic entity with intragroup transactions
being eliminated. The income is then attributed to the respective tax subjects on
the basis of a formula that reflects the factors which are deemed to produce the
income. In most countries of the OECD, the method of formula apportionment is
currently regarded as a lower-ranked method in comparison to the arm’s length
principle. 
In case the organisational structures of affiliated groups change as outlined
above, it is questionable whether and to what extent the tax law which is based
on the economic structures also has to be changed. The objective of this paper is
to give an insight into the main issues of the above-mentioned methods of profit
allocation resulting from the increased use of ICT. It is in a first step examined
                                          
1 See Schneider, 2003: 53; Owens, 2002: 126; Commission of the European Communities, 2001:
263; OECD, 1996: 29-30.
2whether and to what extent the traditional transaction methods of transfer
pricing which are based on the arm’s length principle are still an appropriate
way to allocate profits. The evaluation of the current tax regulations is based on
generally accepted tax principles. The first evaluation criterion is the principle of
inter-nation equity which demands for an allocation of the international tax base
in accordance with the economic allegiance. This means that the revenues shall
be apportioned according to each jurisdiction’s share in the profit-generating
activity of the taxable entity. The second evaluation criterion is the principle of
feasibility, meaning that the method of profit allocation has to be workable in
practice, that it has to prevent manipulations and that it has to be cost-effective. 
Based on these findings regarding the (in)appropriateness of the traditional
transaction methods, in a second step, approaches for reforming the arm’s length
principle are discussed. Reform measures may consist in an adjustment of the
traditional transaction methods, in the application of transactional profit methods
or in the alternative approach of formula apportionment. The reform concepts
should be conform to the international tax principles and, moreover, take into
account considerations developed by other countries or by supranational
institutions, such as the OECD. Special interest is devoted to the proposals of
the Commission of the European Union (EU) regarding possible reforms of
company taxation in the Internal Market. 
2. Changes within the Organisational Structures of Affiliated
Companies by Use of ICT
The increased use of ICT within groups of companies enables new forms of
organisational structures and divisions of labour. As this paper focuses on profit
allocation within economic entities consisting of different legal entities, the
economic changes regarding different forms of such economic entities are
outlined in the following. 
The main group of economic entities are groups of companies.2 Due to the
strong economic relationship between the different legal entities of an affiliated
group, it is economically considered one firm.3 It can be noticed that, as a result
of the ongoing globalisation, the European integration and the use of ICT, the
number as well as the scope of groups of companies have increased.4 Nowadays,
they qualify as a standard organisational form. A group of companies consists of
legally distinct but uniformly managed and economically linked enterprises.
Generally, the parts belonging to such a group are more profitable than they
would be if they were independent.5 Consequently, as an affiliated group can
achieve economies of scope due to the economic interconnection, the excess
                                          
2 The notions “group of companies” and “affiliated group” are used synonymously in this context.
3 See Sydow, 2002: 694; Sydow, 2001: 249; Theisen, 2000: 17-19. 
4 See Doernberg et al., 2001: 81; Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 256, 263. In
2000, about 90% of the German Public Limited Companies and more than half of the German
Partnerships had relations with an affiliated group or equal relations. See Theisen, 2000: 21. 
5 See also Berry et al., 1992: 737. 
3profits achieved at the level of the economic entity have to be appropriately
allocated to the respective companies. Often, the separate enterprises belonging
to an affiliated group reside in different jurisdictions, thus creating a
multinational group of companies (MNG).6 The use of ICT fosters the creation
of MNGs, as the application of ICT facilitates an effective connection between
the different parts of the group of companies. 
In principle, all products can be subject to cross-border and intragroup
transactions. Due to the segmented, international value added process, the share
of intermediate goods in the world trade has increased.7 Besides, a shift from
material products to intangible assets, such as know-how or digital products, can
be observed. Moreover, there is also an increase in services rendered.8 These
observations are due to the fact that the main factors relevant for the company’s
creation of value are nowadays human capital and intangible assets.9 
Furthermore, an organisational decentralisation within groups of companies can
be observed.10 The organisation of affiliated groups tends to be rather
decentralised than based on a hierarchical structure. The basic unit considered is
the economic process which includes the whole value added chain.11 On the
basis of those integrated processes, groups of companies are often organised in
separate entities disposing of the decision making authority and responsibility
for their own results, the so-called modules or profit centres.12 Specific functions
relevant for the whole economic entity are often centralised in a certain
country.13 Possible functions performed in those so-called shared service centres
are, for example, research, management or administrative services.14 Also the
production and distribution of products may be centralised. The fields of
activities of these service centres vary strongly due to the variant activities and
structures of the different affiliated groups. The functionality of a decentralised
organisation is achieved by the use of ICT, as ICT permit an effective exchange
between the different parts of the organisation. Otherwise, the costs of the rise in
transactions and the loss of control due to the decentralised structure would be
too high. The organisational decentralisation in combination with the
internationalisation leads to a rise in intragroup cross-border transactions
regarding both frequency and volume.
As a consequence of the modularisation, intra-organisational networks between
                                          
6 See Li, 2001: 777; Theisen, 2000: 8.
7 See Oestreicher, 2000: 1.
8 See McLure, 2001: 334.
9 See also Brunsbach, 2003: 24-25; McLure, 1997: 861-862 with further quotations.
10 See Brunsbach, 2003: 23; Eicker, 2000: 121; Müller-Stewens, 1997: 35; Endres, 1996: 91-92.
11 See Jacobs, 2003: 114-115; Picot et al., 2001: 231-232; Raupach, 1998: 72-74, 119. The different
value creating chains are fragmented by the legal structure of the firm.
12 See Brunsbach, 2003: 23; Picot et al., 2001: 230, 244-246.
13 See Jacobs, 2003: 117-118; Michel, 2001: 110-111; Theisen, 2000: 174-176; Müller-Stewens,
1997: 24-26; Gomez, 1992: 167.
14 See Jacobs, 2003: 116; Li, 2001: 778-780; Endres, 1996: 94, 96. 
4different business centres emerge.15 The conventional value added chain turns
into value added networks with mutual business relationships.16 In an even
further decentralised structure, intragroup networks between single persons who
belong to different legal entities within the affiliated group emerge. In this case,
services or know-how regarding a certain topic do not have to be centralised in
one business centre.17 For example, several researchers belonging to different
companies of one group and resident in different jurisdictions may work
together in a network, thus forming an intragroup R&D network.18 Other
examples are a data bank that is developed and accessed by employees working
all over the world or global trading.19 The advantage of all these networks lies in
the fact that the work can be done independently of time and place on a 24 hour
basis. Without ICT, such forms of intragroup networks would not be effectively
feasible. Under the constraint of a hierarchical structure, the benefits realised
within those networks would not be that big.20 As the contribution of each
partner to those integrated networks tends to be very small and often consists in
intangible assets such as know-how, it is hard to identify.21
Besides, the structure of each group of companies as well as the products
transferred or services rendered become more and more individual and, thus,
differ more and more in comparison to other affiliated groups.22 For example,
the cost structure as well as the risk structure of companies doing business in the
field of electronic commerce differ substantially from those of companies doing
business in traditional fields. Given digital products, production and distribution
costs are – contrary to material products – not proportional to sales.23
In addition to the organisational form of groups of companies, there are also
other hybrid forms of enterprise co-operation. They constitute a relationship
between legally independent and – except for the co-operation – in general also
economically independent companies.24 The partners within these co-operations
can be affiliated groups or separate entities. As the different forms of co-
operation are often similar, one cannot determine a clear boundary between
                                          
15 See Herzig, 2001: 29; Becker et al., 1999: 19; Müller-Stewens, 1997: 35; Delfmann, 1989: 109.
16 See Strunk and Wichmann, 2001: 429; Oestreicher, 2000: 4.
17 See also Barth et al., 2002: 22.
18 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 950; Li, 2001: 778. Such cases are also called “global development”, see
Sydow, 2002: 697; Kaminski, 2000: 174. See also the example of the Ford Motor Company in
Rayport and Sviokla, 1995: 79. Ford established a virtual team in order to develop a “global car”.
19 See Oestreicher, 2000: 43-44; Eicker, 2000: 122; Selling, 1998: 418; Häuselmann, 1997: 858;
OECD, 1997: 9.
20 See Gomez, 1992: 172.
21 See Picot, 1999: 5.
22 See Strunk and Wichmann, 2001: 429; McLure, 2001: 334.
23 See Strunk and Wichmann, 2001: 428.
24 As these forms of co-operation constitute a mixture between markets and hierarchies, the shift
towards these forms is also called the “move-to-the-middle“. See Clemons et al., 1993: 13. This
effect is due to the „electronic integration-effect“, meaning that the use of ICT leads to a creation
of hybrid forms of co-operation. See Malone et al., 1987: 488.
5them.25 Again, ICT play an enabling role in making these kinds of co-operation
effectively feasible.26 A large share of these forms of enterprise co-operation is
established in order to develop new technology.27 
One form of an enterprise co-operation between different affiliated groups is the
equity joint venture. It constitutes a separate legal and organisational entity that
is owned by the respective partners.28 Generally, the equity joint venture is
owned by each of the participating affiliated groups, but does not unite those
different groups.29 In a contractual joint venture, the partners do not set up a
separate legal entity. They rather engage in contractual obligations only.30 One
form of a contractual joint venture is the so-called strategic alliance, a
horizontal co-operation between two or more entities on the same level in the
value adding process aimed at realising competitive advantages.31 Another form
of a contractual, vertical co-operation are extra-organisational networks, i.e.
networks between entities that do not belong to one affiliated group.32 A further
development of networks between different legal entities consists in the virtual
organisation, a virtual, dynamic, temporary network.33 The link between the
different network partners is realised solely by use of ICT. 
To conclude, the majority of the developments outlined in this section is not
completely new but has accelerated substantially in recent years, which is inter
alia due to the increased use of ICT within economic entities. Consequently, the
economic changes outlined above are nowadays supposed to have a greater
impact on taxation of groups of companies than before.
3. Evaluation Criteria: Normative Criteria for an Optimal Taxation
In general, the current tax regulations as well as possible reform approaches
have to be conform to normative criteria for an optimal taxation. In this paper,
the underlying theoretical framework consists of two generally accepted tax
principles which have to be fulfilled in order to achieve an optimal taxation. 
                                          
25 See Becker et al., 1999: 11; Lange, 1998: 446.
26 See Müller-Stewens: 1997, 14, 30, 50; Picot et al., 1996: 78. 
27 The sectors most commonly involved are electronics, aerospace, telecommunications, computers
as well as automobiles. See OECD, 1996: 44. 
28 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 1198; Michel, 2001: 126.
29 See Michel, 2001: 129; Theisen, 2000: 60.
30 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 1201; Michel, 2001: 134; Bogenschütz and Kestler, 2000: 860.
31 See Michel, 2001: 133; Ernsthaler and Gesmann-Nuissl, 2000: 2270; Backhaus and Meyer, 1993:
332.
32 See the example in Sydow, 2001: 241-243. See also the scenario of large networks between
companies as a possible common organisational form in the future in Laubacher and Malone,
1997: 6-9.
33 See the example of a virtual advertising agency in Matthäus, 2003. See also Li, 2001: 780; Byrne
et al., 1993: 36-38; Davidow and Malone, 1992: 5-7. “Virtual“ characterises the object as
something that possibly exists, but that generates its existence not from the real physis but from
ICT-based structures. See Fink, 1998: 15-16.
63.1. Inter-Nation Equity
The principle of inter-nation equity calls for an equitable allocation of the
international tax base between different countries.34 The apportionment of the
taxable income is considered to be equitable if every country has the right to tax
all profits having their source within its borders. The source of profits is defined
as the location where the profits are created. The underlying principle for
allocating the international tax base according to the creation of profits is the
principle of economic allegiance. It implies that the country within whose
borders the realisation takes place is entitled to tax those profits, as this country
contributes to the generation of profits by providing its legal and economic
system.35 For example, due to the provision of infrastructure, education or a
legal system, business entities are able to operate commercially.36 Therefore, the
profit allocation should take place according to each country’s share in the
profit-generating activities of business entities.37
In order to determine the profits’ source and, thus, the profit-creating factors,
two concepts exist. According to the supply approach, the source of income is
situated where the factors of production of the company generating that income
operate.38 Pursuant to this approach, a consumer market does not represent a
factor contributing to the added value of the company. In contrast, the supply-
demand approach states that profits are created through the interaction of supply
and demand. Consequently, the demand jurisdiction as well has an entitlement
to tax because of the provision of a consumer market.39 
There are several issues inherent in the supply-demand approach. First of all, it
is in principle questionable whether the mere demand constitutes an income-
producing factor and, as a consequence, whether a part of the taxable income
shall be assigned to the demand jurisdiction solely for providing a consumer
market.40 
Besides, in order to apply the supply-demand approach, feasibility problems
arise. The first issue consist in the fact that it gets more and more difficult to
determine the place of demand in an exact and, at the same time, cost-effective
way. Generally, the place of demand is defined as the place of the destination of
the product. Due to the rise in the use of ICT and the increased application of
electronic commerce resulting thereof, problems of determining a product’s
place of destination emerge. For example, especially in case of the sale of digital
                                          
34 Inter-nation equity is confined to revenue shares. See Musgrave, 2000: 54. The division of the
“tax cake” is seen as the main practical function of international tax rules. See Bird, 1988: 297.
35 See Avi-Yonah, 1997: 520-521; Zuber, 1991: 111; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1972: 71. 
36 See Fohr, 2001: 77; McLure, 2000: 11.
37 See Musgrave, 1972: 400.
38 See Oestreicher, 2000: 179; Musgrave, 1984: 234.
39 It is worth mentioning that this entitlement of the demand jurisdiction goes far beyond the claim
to tax profits on capital invested in the selling activity or attributed to labour in that activity, a
claim that is also covered by the supply approach. See Musgrave, 1984: 234.
40 See also the discussion in Oestreicher, 2000: 183-184, as well as Musgrave, 1984: 234, stating
that there is no straightforward economic basis for answering this question.
7products via ICT, the customer may remain anonymous and his place of
residence may be hard to identify with reasonable effort. Although there are
possibilities to trace the way and the final destination of data in the Internet, this
is only achieved in a time-consuming and cost-intensive manner and, thus, is
impracticable. Besides, another issue concerning the destination of sales arises.
In the event that intermediate products of one company serve as an input for a
final product of another company which then sells the final product to a
customer, it is difficult to clearly define the destination of the first sale.41 The
same issue comes into existence in the event that products are resold. As the
share of intermediate products has risen due to the organisational
decentralisation of a company, these problems are becoming more frequent.
Second, a taxation of the company’s profits in the demand jurisdiction is
generally only possible if the company disposes of a tax attribute in this
jurisdiction.42 Otherwise, the company is not liable to taxation in the demand
jurisdiction. As, due to the increased use of ICT, it becomes easier to do
business in a certain country without establishing a physical presence there, a
nexus of the company in the demand jurisdiction according to the current
definition of a permanent establishment may often not be created. Consequently,
the demand factor in the supply-demand approach can unfold its effect less
often, as the underlying intention of attributing a portion of income to the
demand jurisdiction cannot be realised. To conclude, due to those theoretical
and practical issues inherent in the demand factor, the supply approach shall be
preferred over the supply-demand approach. 
3.2. Feasibility
Besides the criterion of inter-nation equity, the system of international company
taxation has to be feasible. This means that the tax system has to be enforceable
in practice and, thus, has to have the capacity to achieve its basic objectives.
First of all, inter-nation equity can only be achieved if the tax system is feasible.
Another main objective of the system of international taxation is to guarantee
equal law enforcement. Therefore, possibilities of manipulation have to be
avoided.43 This implies for the profit allocation between different jurisdictions
that the allocation method is not susceptible for profit shifting and that it does
not lead to business operations which are solely effected by fiscal reasons and
not by business reasons. Feasibility of a tax system also includes cost
effectiveness. This means that the costs of the operation of a tax system are
minimised. These costs consist of compliance costs for the taxpayer as well as
administrative costs for the public authorities, such as control costs of the abuse
of law.44 Furthermore, another objective of taxation is that the income is taxed
exactly one time, which means that a double taxation of the income has to be
                                          
41 See Oestreicher, 2000: 184. 
42 See Oestreicher, 2000: 182, 184; McLure, 1997: 863. 
43 See Utescher, 1999: 335; Schaumburg, 1998: 79; Theisen, 1990: 22.
44 See Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 28; OECD, 1998: 4.
8prevented.45 To conclude, the requirement of a feasible system of international
company taxation is of high importance, as it constitutes the basis for the
achievement of several other objectives of international tax law.
4. Application of the Arm’s Length Principle to the Changed
Economic Structures
4.1. General Attributes of the Traditional Transaction Methods
In case several legal entities form an economic entity, such as a MNG, and
transactions take place between these legal entities, they have common interests
and do not act as third parties on markets. As a consequence, the issue of
determining an adequate transfer price emerges, meaning that a benchmark has
to be found which indicates a range of adequate transfer prices in terms of a
bandwidth. According to the arm’s length principle (ALP), the price that would
have been negotiated between independent third parties constitutes the
benchmark for determining an appropriate transfer price. The intention behind is
that the valuation of economic relations between related parties shall not differ
from the one between unrelated parties.46 Thus, affiliated companies carrying
out cross-border business must do so on market principles.47 The separate entity
approach in combination with the ALP is codified in Article 9 section 1 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention as well as in section 1 of the German Foreign
Transactions Tax Act. 
The ALP is applied in three different traditional transaction methods. According
to the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUPM), the price for goods or
services transferred in a transaction between affiliated entities is compared to the
price charged for the same goods or services transferred in a comparable
transaction between independent parties.48 A transaction is deemed to be
comparable if there are no differences between the transactions being compared
which could materially affect the respective conditions being examined, or that
any such differences can be eliminated by reasonably accurate adjustments.49
Attributes of a transaction that have to be comparable include the characteristics
of the goods or services transferred, the functions performed, the assets used and
risks assumed by the respective parties, the contractual terms, the economic
circumstances of the parties as well as their business strategy pursued.50 The
underlying assumption of the CUPM is that, in case of an uncontrolled
transaction, the buyer would not accept a price above the market price, whereas
the seller would not accept a price below.51 As the CUPM is deemed to be the
most direct and reliable method, it is preferred to all other methods.52 The resale
                                          
45 See also Theisen, 1990: 22.
46 See Oestreicher, 2000: 14.
47 See Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 256.
48 See OECD, 2001: 2.6.
49 See OECD, 2001: 1.15.
50 See OECD, 2001: 1.17-1.35 with further details and Musgrave, 1972: 403.
51 See Oestreicher, 2000: 110; Helbing, 1995: 65.
52 See Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 258.
9price method (RPM) is based on the price at which a product that has been
purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent enterprise.
First, the gross margin on a transaction between affiliated entities is compared to
the gross margin of a comparable uncontrolled transaction. Then, the resale
price to a third party is reduced by the resale price margin. The remainder
constitutes the arm’s length price for the original transaction between the
associated enterprises.53 The cost plus method (CPM) starts with the costs
incurred by the supplier in a transaction between affiliated companies for
products transferred or services provided to a related purchaser.54 Then, a cost
plus mark up that is consistent with mark ups in uncontrolled transactions is
added to these costs in order to raise the price to the level that would have been
concluded between unrelated parties.55 
4.2. The Impact of ICT on the Incidence of Transfer Pricing Issues
Due to the ICT-induced changes of the economic structures, it is questionable to
what extent these changes have an impact on the incidence of transfer pricing
issues. Generally, issues of profit allocation emerge if different legal entities are
under common control and form an economic entity. Then, in case of a
transaction, there is no divergence of interests between the two parties.56 In
order to narrow down all those cases in which issues of profit allocation occur, it
has to be determined whether an economic entity exists and how this entity can
be delimited. Therefore, one has to examine the economic boundaries of the
firm. An economic entity is usually defined by the following criteria: a
minimum holding quota (financial integration), an integration of central
functions and the existence of economies of scope (economic integration), and a
common control or a common management (organisational integration).57
However, nowadays, these criteria do not always lead to a clear delimitation of
an economic entity. Instead of boundaries that are clearly defined by attributes
such as intercompany participation, ownership of property or a hierarchical
organisation, these boundaries are quite blurry due to the emergence of different
hybrid forms of co-operation, which constitute a complex network of
relationships between different companies or different affiliated groups.58 Thus,
the boundaries of an economic entity are represented by a bundle of
relationships. For these relationships, it is often difficult to find out whether the
partners have divergent interests or not. Consequently, it becomes more difficult
to determine the exact boundaries of an economic entity and also to determine
whether an economic entity exists at all. To conclude, the emergence of hybrid
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55 See Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 258.
56 See also OECD, 2001: 1.29; McLure, 1984: 105.
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58 See also Sydow and Windeler, 2001: 134; Müller-Stewens, 1997: 46-49; OECD, 1996: 43-45;
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forms of co-operation between different affiliated groups increases the
uncertainty regarding the boundaries of an economic entity and, thus,
concerning the question whether problems of transfer pricing emerge. In the
end, this question has to be answered on a case-by-case basis.
4.3. The Arm’s Length Principle and Inter-Nation Equity
In the following, it is examined to what extent the ALP is consistent with the
principle of inter-nation equity, given the economic changes by use of ICT.
Pursuant to the ALP, market prices constitute the benchmark for profit
allocation. Thus, the ALP is based on the economic assumption of perfect
market conditions. They imply perfect competition with easily verifiable free
market prices, no interdependencies between the respective parties of a
transaction and homogeneous products.59 However, it is questionable whether
these basic assumptions underlying the ALP can be upheld. In principle, income
allocation according to the ALP leads to reasonable results in those cases in
which transactions between controlled parties take place under market
conditions.60 As in those cases, the allocation of profits between related parties
is equivalent to the one between unrelated parties, the application of market
prices results in an allocation of profits in accordance with the profit-generating
activities of the members of a MNG. Consequently, the ALP is in accordance
with the principle of inter-nation equity. 
However, these situations are rather seldom. The reason for several companies
to form a MNG is the possibility to gain excess profits which accrue on the level
of the affiliated group and, thus, are not attributable to the legal entities.61 Thus,
larger profits accrue to the affiliated group taken as a whole than would to each
unit operating independently. The internal economies generated within a MNG
may, for example, consist of an improvement of information flow, quality
control, managerial efficiency or lower transactional costs.62 As such economies
of integration resulting from the interconnections between different firms do
simply not exist in case of transactions under market conditions, those
economies of scope cannot be allocated correctly by means of separate
accounting.63 Consequently, the comparison of controlled transactions with
uncontrolled transactions seems illogical and systematically inapplicable, as the
ALP does not contain a rule for considering and allocating these excess profits.64
Besides, another general difference between controlled and uncontrolled parties
consists in the division of functions and risks assumed by the respective
                                          
59 See Helbing, 1995: 65-66; Theisen, 1990: 24; McLure, 1984: 93.
60 See also Oestreicher, 2000: 24; McLure, 1984: 93.
61 See Schneider, 2003: 54; Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 875; Oestreicher, 2000: 20; Higinbotham and
Levey, 1998: 235; Bird, 1988: 294; Musgrave, 1972: 403.
62 See Berry et al., 1992: 737.
63 See also Newlon, 2000: 216.
64 See also Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 875-876; Schröer, 2002: 16; Oestreicher, 2000: 20; Herzig, 1998:
285; Portner, 1992: 865; de Hosson, 1991: 146; McLure, 1984: 94, 105.
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parties.65 This is due to the fact that in case of an integrated group, there may
often be reasons for dividing the functions and risks in a ratio differing from the
proportion between unrelated parties. For example, a high level of downstream
autonomy may be desired and, consequently, a substantial decision-making
autonomy is granted to the downstream subsidiaries.66 Besides, contrary to third
parties, in a MNG certain functions can be centralised in special service centres.
As the determination of transfer prices depends on the functions and risks
assumed, such differences have to be taken into account. 
Furthermore, unrelated parties are co-ordinated via contracts whereas related
parties are additionally regulated via a relationship under company law. This
means that in case of a situation between uncontrolled parties, the divergence of
interests ensures that the parties seek to hold each other to the terms of the
contract and that the contractual terms are only ignored or modified if it is in the
common interest of both parties.67 The enforcement of the respective terms of
the contract is possible only by means of the legal process. As this conflict of
interest does not exist between related parties, contracts between them do not
have to be legally enforced but may also be enforced by other means pursuant to
the intention of the dominant company.68 Besides, contracts between controlled
parties can be altered easily. Therefore, associated enterprises can conclude a
much greater variety of contracts and arrangements than unrelated enterprises.69 
To summarise, the ALP is in accordance with the principle of inter-nation equity
in those cases in which transactions between third parties are carried out under
market conditions.70 However, often general differences between controlled and
uncontrolled companies exist. Due to the use of ICT, those differences become
more significant as well as more frequent, because ICT facilitate the creation of
MNGs. Thus, it is necessary to take these differences into account. As the ALP
ignores these fundamental differences, it does not lead to an allocation in
accordance with the profit-generating activities of a company, but, instead, may
lead to economic distortions. Accordingly, the ALP is then inconsistent with the
principle of inter-nation equity.71 
4.4. Feasibility of the Arm’s Length Principle
Comparability of Controlled and Uncontrolled Transactions
One of the essentials of the ALP consists in the comparability of transactions
between controlled and uncontrolled parties. Due to the increased use of ICT
                                          
65 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 876 with further examples.
66 See Higinbotham and Levey, 1998: 238 with further details. 
67 See OECD, 2001: 1.29.
68 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 877.
69 See OECD, 2001: 1.39.
70 See also Oestreicher, 2000: 24, 124; Bird, 1988: 298; McLure, 1984: 93.
71 See Higinbotham and Levey, 1998: 237; McLure, 1984: 95-96. Besides, as regards the
determination of the source of income, the ALP is consistent with the supply approach, as the
demand factor is not considered an income producing factor and does not play any role for the
apportionment of the tax base. See also Oestreicher, 2000: 180.
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and the resulting changes in the organisational structures of MNGs, the
comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions can be guaranteed less
frequently. First of all, the characteristics of goods transferred or services
rendered are often not comparable, as the value of the products transferred and
services rendered within MNGs often results from their specific relevance for
the respective parties.72 This effect is reinforced to a high degree by the fact that
intangibles are becoming more frequent and, thus, more important within the
economy.73 Especially in case of intangibles, such as know-how or proprietary
technology, the value of the intangible is unique to the relevant parties.74 
Besides, also the functions performed and risks assumed constitute decisive
attributes for finding a comparable transaction. As, due to the increased use of
ICT, the organisational structures of MNGs become more individual and differ
from those of independent parties, also the allocations of functions and risks are
less comparable.75 In addition, the business strategies pursued constitute an
attribute that has to be comparable. As a group of companies has a different
economic potential and market position compared to a single company, it may
have a different variety of business strategies. Consequently, also the business
strategies pursued are often not comparable.
Identification of Transactions
Even if a controlled transaction is comparable to an uncontrolled transaction,
still all relevant attributes have to be identifiable in practice. Due to the
increased use of ICT, the identification of different attributes of a transaction
becomes more and more difficult. First, the identification of the goods or
services transferred poses a problem. As digitised goods, for example a software
program, or other intangible assets, such as know-how, can be transferred via
the Internet or an Intranet, these transactions are hard to identify. In contrast to a
transaction that is performed physically, a transfer of digital products or other
intangibles by means of ICT does not leave any marks. Besides, it may also be
difficult to identify services which are rendered over the Internet or Intranet, as
they do not leave any traceable attributes that are relevant for taxation.76 Second,
several transactions often form a bundle of transactions, for example if products
are transferred in combination with the respective services rendered. Thus, it is
hard to keep these transactions apart. In addition, the identification of separate
transactions becomes more difficult, as they are a part of a value added network
with mutual relationships between several parties. This is especially valid for the
case of world-wide simultaneous co-operations, such as R&D networks or
                                          
72 See Oestreicher, 2000: 24; McLure, 1984: 93.
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74 See also Newlon, 2000: 215-216; Herzig, 1998: 285; Möbus, 1992: 408.
75 See for further details also section 4.3. and Wichmann, 1999: 196.
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global trading.77 As a consequence, third, also the relevant partners of a
transaction and, in connection with this, their functions performed and risks
assumed are not always easily identifiable. 
To conclude, as the scope for finding and identifying comparable uncontrolled
transactions is diminishing, the traditional transfer pricing methods tend to be
less reliable.78 The extent of the different issues depends on the nature of the
controlled transaction as well as on the respective standard transfer pricing
method applied. The problems regarding comparability and identification
especially have an impact on the CUPM, as it is directly based on comparable
uncontrolled transactions.79 Furthermore, the RPM as well as the CPM are
impaired by the lack of comparables, as they are also based on comparable
uncontrolled transactions in order to identify comparable margins.
Consequently, the problems of feasibility immanent in the ALP constrain the
applicability of all three methods. 
Manipulation
Transfer pricing can be used to shift profits from countries with a high tax
burden to those with a relatively low tax burden.80 Profit shifting is achieved by
stipulating licence fees and prices for products transferred or services rendered
that are not commensurate. For the tax administration, it becomes more and
more difficult to control the appropriateness of those transfer prices. The advent
of ICT reinforces the issues regarding the manipulation of transfer prices as an
instrument for profit-shifting, as ICT provide for a shift to highly mobile
intangible assets and a new mobility of activities as well as products.81 It is
difficult to assess the extent to which transfer prices are used to shift profits
without economic reasons. At least, evidence of profit shifting by use of transfer
prices can be found within the EU and the United States.82
It has to be noticed that the incentive to shift profits to low tax countries depends
on the specification of the scope of taxation in international tax law.83 Generally,
there are two possibilities to tax foreign income and to avoid double taxation. In
case of taxation according to the source principle, the foreign profits generated
in the source country are finally taxed according to the valuations of the source
country. Under the tax exemption method, the income is exempted from taxation
in the residence country. Taxation pursuant to the residence principle means that
the world-wide income is finally taxed according to the valuations of the
residence country. Under the tax credit method, the foreign income is included
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in the taxable base in the residence country and taxes paid in the source country
are credited against the tax due in the residence country. Generally, the
allocation of the taxable base is independent from whether the residence
principle or the source principle is applied.84 However, the incentive to shift
profits to low-tax countries mainly accrues in case of taxation according to the
source principle, as the advantage of a potentially lower tax burden can only be
taken in case of a final taxation in the source country. Whereas, in case of
taxation according to the residence principle, a possibly lower tax burden is
overridden by the final taxation according to the valuations of the residence
country. The benefit of shifting income to the source country then exists in
deferring taxation, as the profits are not taxed until distribution.85 This advantage
is of a high importance in international tax planning.
Cost-Effectiveness
When applying the traditional transaction methods, the tax compliance costs on
the side of the taxpayer include costs for finding comparables, documenting the
respective transfer prices as well as defending these prices in audits. It is
estimated that large MNGs incur compliance costs related to transfer pricing of
approximately 4 to 5.5 million € a year.86 With the advent of ICT, the tax
compliance procedure regarding transfer pricing becomes even more cost-
intensive. As necessary data for finding comparables is often not readily
available, the costs of the search increase. Besides, the large scale of integration,
the emergence of value added networks as well as the decreasing quantity of
contributions to the value added imply that the identification and documentation
of such small contributions to the creation of value tend to be unprofitable.87
Furthermore, the substantial increase in the quantity of transactions and the
rising number of entities taking part in a transaction accumulate the compliance
costs to a great extent. 
With regard to the tax administration, the costs concerning transfer pricing
include costs of control and verification of transfer prices, prevention of
manipulation as well as costs of transfer pricing disputes. As manipulation
becomes more frequent, the countermeasures have to be intensified. Thus, costs
are accumulated to a certain extent.88 The costs of control might be lowered by
increasing the documentation requirements that have to be met by the taxpayer.
In recent years, the documentation duties were extended in several countries.89
However, this measure does not lead to a more cost-effective taxation, as, in
                                          
84 See Spengel, 2003: 315; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMF, 1999: 67-68.
85 Additionally, a tax-free disposal of shares is possible. See Spengel, 2003: 302-303; Jacobs, 2003:
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turn, it increases the costs on the side of the taxpayer. 
Prevention of Double Taxation
Another problem of the ALP is the one of double taxation, as the transfer prices
determined by the two jurisdictions involved in a cross-border transaction often
differ.90 For example, one jurisdiction may adjust a given transfer price because
the price is deemed as not being at arm’s length. In most cases, the other
jurisdiction does not make a corresponding adjustment. Generally, the taxpayer
does not qualify for a respective adjustment. However, according to the EU tax
arbitration convention, an agreement between the respective jurisdictions is
obligatory, which constitutes a good means to avoid double taxation.91 
To summarise, an increasing number of cases emerge in which the ALP is not
feasible due to several reasons. As a consequence, a tax system that is not
feasible cannot comply with other tax principles, such as inter-nation equity. 
4.5. Interim Result
In order to conclude, first, there are still cases in which the ALP works, that is if
intragroup transactions are conducted under market conditions and if a market
price can be found. Due to the increased use of ICT within groups of companies,
the issues inherent in the ALP, especially the problems with the principles of
inter-nation equity and feasibility, are accumulated to a great extent and now
raised in a new dimension.92 As mentioned above, the tax system always has to
be consistent with the underlying economic structure. Due to the increased use
of ICT and the above-mentioned problems resulting thereof, the ALP tends to be
not in conformity with the underlying organisational structures of MNGs. The
more often these issues occur, the more important it gets to consider alternative
approaches which address and overcome these problems.93 Such alternatives
might, on the one hand, consist in modifications of certain attributes of the ALP.
On the other hand, the separate entity approach may be replaced by an
alternative method of profit allocation, such as formula apportionment. 
5. Possible Reform Approaches
5.1. Selected Adjustments of the Traditional Transaction Methods
In order to cope with several of the above-mentioned issues of the ALP in the
light of feasibility, different approaches exist. One feasibility problem of the
traditional transaction methods is that several transactions are so closely linked
that they cannot be evaluated adequately on a separate basis. Consequently, one
suggestion is to bundle several transaction and to assess them together using the
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most appropriate arm’s length method.94 Eligible for aggregation are those
transactions which are so closely linked or continuous that they cannot be
assessed adequately on a separate basis, as for example in case of global trading
or electronic commerce. Even if this package deal might reduce some feasibility
issues of the traditional transaction methods, it does not constitute a remedy for
other problems regarding feasibility, such as the lack of comparables.95 
Advance pricing agreements (APAs) constitute another method to cope with the
issues of feasibility regarding the proceeding of the transfer pricing negotiations.
In advance of controlled transactions, companies conclude APAs with the tax
administration in order to specify an appropriate set of criteria for the
determination of the transfer price, such as the transfer pricing method to be
applied to those transactions over a fixed period of time.96 However, it is
questionable whether APAs can render taxation more effective, as they may also
be cost-intensive and time-consuming. On the side of the taxpayer, the costs of
providing information are very high, as the documentation requirements are
extensive.97 On the side of the tax administration, the conclusion of APAs
requires a lot of resources as well.98 The high costs on both sides are also caused
by the long duration of the negotiation of APAs which generally lasts at least
two years, in case of a multilateral APA even longer.99 It is therefore
questionable whether a proceeding that causes such a high administrative effort
can cope with the complicated exchange of products and services between
related enterprises.100 As regards the prevention of double taxation, unilateral
APAs cannot prevent double taxation and, thus, are inadvisable.101 The
conclusion of bi- or multilateral APAs represents a suitable method to prevent
double taxation, but it is more complex and time-consuming.102 Thus, bi- and
multilateral APAs can, in principle, be regarded as a suitable means of
enhancing the mutual agreement procedure.103 However, APAs do not constitute
a means of coping with the other issues of the ALP regarding the principle of
feasibility, such as the lack of comparables and the difficulties of identification. 
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To conclude, these two forms of adjusting the traditional transfer pricing
methods are intended to reduce only selected issues in the light of feasibility and
they cannot address the severe problems of the ALP in the light of inter-nation
equity. Therefore, more extensive reform measures have to be considered.
5.2. Transactional Profit Methods 
The profit based transactional methods were mainly developed to cope with the
issues immanent in the traditional transfer pricing methods and to handle more
complex cases, such as those involving intangible property.104 According to the
OECD, both methods are deemed to be consistent with the ALP, but only
applicable in case the traditional transaction methods cannot reliably be applied.
Pursuant to the transactional profit split method (TPSM), the combined profit
that arises from a controlled transaction between associated enterprises is, in a
first step, identified. In a second step, the profit is split among the relevant
parties on a basis reflecting the division that would have been concluded
between uncontrolled parties.105 As this division is made according to the
contribution of the two parties, the functions performed and risks undertaken
have to be determined and assessed for each transaction in a functional analysis.
The TPSM does not directly rely on closely comparable transactions.106
Therefore, it is deemed to be useful in those cases in which no such transactions
between uncontrolled parties can be found, as in case of interrelated transactions
or unique intangibles.107 The transactional net margin method (TNMM)
examines the net profit margin relative to an appropriate base that a taxpayer
realises from a controlled transaction and compares this figure to the net profit
margin between uncontrolled parties.108 Thereby, costs, sales or assets may serve
as a base. The appropriate transfer price is then calculated by either subtracting
the net profit margin or by adding it to the total costs. Thus, the TNMM operates
in a manner similar to the CPM and the RPM, with the difference that the
TNMM compares net margins, the two latter gross margins.109 The TNMM does
not require the same amount of detailed information concerning the cost base.110 
When evaluating the transactional profit methods in the light of inter-nation
equity, the same implications as for the traditional transaction methods arise, as
all methods are somehow based on the ALP. Consequently, transactional profit
methods do not constitute a remedy for these issues. As regards the principle of
feasibility, especially the TPSM does not require the same degree of
comparability as the traditional transfer pricing methods. Consequently, for
certain transactions, the transactional profit methods can better cope with the
                                          
104 See Horner and Owens, 1996: 520.
105 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 941-943; Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 258; OECD,
2001: 3.5; Li, 2001: 784; Oestreicher, 2000: 67-70; Avi-Yonah, 1997: 546.
106 See Oestreicher, 2000: 66.
107 See OECD, 2001: 3.6; Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 258.
108 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 938-939; OECD, 2001: 3.25.
109 See Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 940; Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 258.
110 See Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 258.
18
principle of feasibility. However, the general issue of collecting data of
uncontrolled transactions, such as the profit split or the allocation of functions
and risks, still exists.111 Besides, when applying the TPSM, a double taxation of
profits can only be prevented if all countries use identical methods of profit
determination.112 
To sum up, transactional profit methods may, in certain cases, constitute an
improvement compared to traditional transaction methods, as the required
amount of comparable data is deemed to be less extensive. However, the data
required still has to be identifiable. Besides, they cannot cope with the issues
regarding the principle of inter-nation equity. Other important issues regarding
the transactional profit methods are that, in practice, independent parties rarely
establish their prices based on a profit method. Furthermore, profit margins or
splits can be effected by factors that are irrelevant to the determination of
transfer prices, such as management inefficiencies.113 As a consequence, it has
to be examined whether indirect methods of profit allocation represent an
alternative.
5.3. Formula Apportionment
5.3.1. General Attributes
According to the unitary method, the whole economic entity is considered one
taxable entity.114 It is assumed that the economic entity, such as a MNG, is
divided into legal entities for formal reasons only, such as the organisational
structure.115 The profits are supposed to be generated on the level of the
economic entity through transactions with third parties.116 So far, the unitary
method in combination with formula apportionment (FA) has not been applied
between countries but only between local taxing jurisdictions, such as between
the federal states in the United States, the provinces in Canada and – regarding
the trade income tax – the federal states in Germany.117 However, these forms of
indirect methods of profit allocation are becoming increasingly important, as in
2001 the European Commission released a study regarding Company Taxation
in the EU which contains different approaches of allocating profits in an indirect
way. According to the OECD, an indirect method of profit allocation is only
applicable in case of a permanent establishment.118 For allocating profits
between separate legal entities, the method of FA is clearly rejected, as it is not
deemed to be consistent with the ALP.119 However, from an economical point of
view, an affiliated group representing one economic entity can be considered as
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being comparable to an individual enterprise disposing of a permanent
establishment. 
In order to implement the unitary method in combination with FA, in a first step,
the scope of the unitary business has to be defined. Then, the income of the
whole group of companies is consolidated with intragroup transactions being
eliminated.120 The income is then allocated to the respective jurisdictions by
reference to a predetermined formula, which attributes a fraction of a company’s
total income to the taxing jurisdiction equal to the weighted average of the
jurisdiction’s share in the economic activities of the company.121 The factors
included in the formula which are deemed to represent the source of income are
typically property, payroll and sales.122 
The development and use of the unitary method in combination with FA is due
to the fact that the ALP cannot adequately capture the many subtle and largely
not quantifiable transfers of value taking place between the different parts of an
affiliated group. As outlined above, particularly due to the increased use of ICT
within the economy, the issues regarding the ALP have aggravated. It is in the
following examined whether and to what extent the method of FA can better
cope with the principles of inter-nation equity and feasibility. The focus is on the
issues which arise due to the increased use of ICT. As the concept of FA is
elaborated the most in the United States, the respective regulations are taken as
an example for the analysis.
5.3.2. The Impact of ICT on the Scope of a Unitary Business
Basically, the application of the unitary method presupposes that the scope of
the unitary business, i.e. of the economic entity, is defined. The general criteria
for defining an economic entity were already outlined in section 4.2. Also in
practice, different concepts for defining the unitary business exist. In the United
States, for example, there is no clear definition of a unitary business for state tax
purposes. In contrast, there are generally four tests which have been developed
by the courts and which all combine the above-mentioned criteria in a slightly
different way.123 Even though the unitary method has already been applied for a
certain time in the United States, a clear cut benchmark for the existence of a
unitary business has not been established yet. Quite the contrary, it is stated that
almost overwhelming problems exist in attempting to define with any degree of
precision what constitutes a unitary business.124 Consequently, already before
the increased use of ICT, defining a unitary business was extremely difficult and
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constituted a major source of administrative complexity.125 Nowadays, with the
advent of ICT, the problem of defining the scope of the unitary business
becomes even bigger. As the use of ICT leads to an increase in hybrid forms of
enterprise co-operation, the boundaries of an economic entity and, thus, of a
unitary business are blurring. The issues of determining the scope of a unitary
business are comparable to those of the separate entity approach regarding the
question outlined in section 4.2. whether or not a transfer pricing problem exists.
5.3.3. Valuation Regarding Inter-Nation Equity and Feasibility
Inter-Nation Equity
The unitary approach is not based on comparable data, but considers just the
unique economic reality of one economic entity. Consequently, it is not
presumed that transactions between controlled parties are comparable to those
between uncontrolled parties. The basic essentials immanent in a unitary
business – the existence of economies of scope due to the close integration
between the different parts of the commonly owned business – are taken into
account.126 Thus, regarding inter-nation equity, the unitary method is deemed to
be based on a methodically correct theoretical background, as it considers the
economic reality of a unitary business and does not compare it to others.
However, when implementing the unitary method combined with FA in practice,
it depends on the scope of the unitary business and the formula used whether the
objective of inter-nation equity can be achieved. 
Feasibility
The intention behind the implementation of FA was to provide a pragmatic
solution of profit allocation among jurisdictions in order to better cope with the
feasibility issues inherent in the ALP. First, in those cases in which the ALP is
simply not feasible because the comparable data does not exist or cannot be
identified, FA shall represent a more workable solution.127 Second, regarding the
benchmark for profit allocation, the complex search for comparables and their
identification is replaced by a simple, generalised mathematical formula. Due to
the simplicity of the formula, the application of FA is supposed to be more cost-
effective in practice than the ALP. Third, FA is intended to prevent income
shifting, as the issues regarding manipulation by use of transfer prices shall be
dissolved.128 Forth, the unitary method shall prevent the risk of double taxation
inherent in the separate entity approach. Whether the unitary approach in
combination with FA can really provide for a feasible taxation depends again on
the respective determinants, which are the definition of the unitary business as
well as the allocating formula. 
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127 See McLure, 1989: 246. 
128 See, regarding the United States and Germany, Jacobs (Ed.), 2002: 949; McLure and Martens
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5.3.3.1. The Definition of a Unitary Business
One criterion for defining a unitary business is a reasonable minimum holding
quota that may amount up to 75% or even 95% or 100%.129 In the light of the
principle of feasibility, a realisation of such a legal test would be workable, cost-
effective and would provide for a clear cut solution. However, a minimum
holding quota can be circumvented, as it allows companies to arrange its
business structure in order to avoid taxation.130 In the range of economic
criteria, common control constitutes one prerequisite of a unitary business.
Besides, another fundamental characteristic is the existence of economies of
scope or other economic interdependencies. These interdependencies must be
substantial, so that an allocation based on separate accounting does not provide a
reliable result and is practically impossible.131 The fact that such
interdependencies are becoming more frequent due to ICT encourages the
inclusion of economic factors in the definition of a unitary business as the main
criteria. However, economic criteria are less feasible, as they require a high
administrative effort, are rather subjective and do not provide legal certainty.
The use of ICT reinforces these issues, as economic interrelations are hard to
identify.132 
Besides, an allocation of profits according to the source of profits is only
consistent with the principle of inter-nation equity if the scope of the attributable
profits includes all relevant sources according to the supply approach. This can,
in general, better be guaranteed by economic criteria than by the legal criterion
of a minimal holding quota, as the allocating factors in the formula are also
based on economic criteria. 
In order to summarise, in theory, the definition of the scope of the unitary
business shall consist of economic criteria, as it depends just on economic
criteria whether a unitary business exists.133 However, in case these criteria do
not represent a sufficient level of legal certainty or shall turn out to be
impracticable, a minimum holding quota can provide for a workable solution.
5.3.3.2. The Factors Included in the Apportionment Formula 
Sales Factor
As implemented in the United States, the sales factor includes all gross receipts
of the taxpayer from the sale of tangible and intangible property as well as from
the performance of services. Generally, sales are sited at their destination. As
deduced in section 3.1. in the context of inter-nation equity, the supply approach
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shall be preferred over the supply-demand approach in order to determine the
source of income. Consequently, as the sales factor represents the demand side
in the apportionment formula, the latter shall generally not be included in the
formula in terms of inter-nation equity. 
The practical experience in the United States also shows general concerns
regarding the demand factor, as the sales factor is the most difficult to calculate
and to administer.134 The valuation of sales and the determination of the demand
location often pose problems.135 Especially with the increase in digital
transactions, the location of sales becomes more complex. According to the
regulations in the United States, the income is excluded if sales cannot be
attributed.136 Due to ICT, these exclusions are deemed to occur more often.
Furthermore, the attribution of income from intangibles poses problems in
practice: Generally, sales resulting from intangibles are according to the
regulations in the United States assigned to the state in which the income-
producing activity is performed, or, if these activities are performed in multiple
states, in which the greatest proportion is performed based on costs of
performance.137 Thus, the income is not attributed to the demand jurisdiction,
but to the jurisdiction where the supply is located. Besides, in case the company
is not taxable in the country of destination, a “throwback” rule is applied
according to the current regulations in the United States, attributing the income
to the state of origin.138 As all the aforementioned examples occur more often
due to ICT, the sales factor cannot unfold its impact and is not workable. In
addition, the fact that the sales factor is mobile and not easily determinable
entails the incentive to manipulate this factor.139 Contrary to these feasibility
problems immanent in the sales factor, in the United States, a tendency towards
an increased weight of the sales factor can be observed, which is due to political
reasons. As at the same time the payroll and property factors are decreased,
business investments shall be attracted.140 
To conclude, the theoretical concern about including a demand factor is largely
affirmed when considering the practice in the United States: An inclusion of the
sales factor is neither consistent with the principle of inter-nation equity nor with
feasibility, especially when considering the ICT-induced organisational changes
within the economy. Consequently, the implementation of the sales factor in an
apportionment formula is not recommendable.141 
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Property Factor
The underlying idea of including property in the apportionment formula is that
the jurisdiction in which a company’s property is located shall be entitled to tax
a portion of the income generated by use of the property, as the source of profits
is within the jurisdiction’s borders. The definition of the property factor
currently used in the United States includes all real and tangible property of the
taxpayer, such as land, buildings, machinery, stocks of goods or equipment.142
The property is measured at original costs.143 Besides, equal productivity is
presumed.144 However, even more severe problems occur in case of intangibles,
their treatment is even called the “Achilles heel” of FA.145 
In the United States, intangible assets are excluded from the property factor due
to practical problems. When this rule was established in the 1950s, a
manufacturing age, income from intangibles was not deemed to be significant.
However, due to the use of ICT, intangible assets are becoming more important
for the generation of profits, whereas the importance of tangible assets is
relatively decreasing. In order to comply with the principle of inter-nation
equity, the property factor has to comprise the relevant parts of a company’s
property. As a consequence, intangibles have to be included in the property
factor in order to obtain an apportionment of profits that is consistent with inter-
nation equity. Otherwise, a decisive income producing factor is missing in the
formula and, consequently, the income is not allocated to its sources.146 
The principle of feasibility is fulfilled if the valuation as well as the location of
the income generated by use of a company’s property is workable in practice.
However, including intangible assets in the property factor entails several issues,
above all the valuation as well as the location of intangibles.147 In theory, a
valuation according to the actual fair market value is preferable, which is
determined by the discounted value of the anticipated income inflow the
property will generate.148 However, in the majority of cases, these figures cannot
be measured properly.149 Contrary to the market price, more often, the costs for
creating and maintaining an intangible can be determined. Taking the example
of patents or know-how, the costs of R&D could be used to determine the value
of the respective intangible.150 Certainly, the use of costs for determining the
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value of intangibles may be problematic, as there is not necessarily a link
between the costs of creating and maintaining the intangible assets and their
actual fair market value.151 This problem especially holds for highly profitable
intangibles. However, as the costs incurred may serve as a workable
approximation, a valuation at costs seems to be the relatively best solution for
the time being, especially against the background of feasibility. In any case, in
terms of inter-nation equity, such an approximation is better than the total
exclusion of intangibles. 
In addition, the location of intangibles is necessary in order to assign them to a
certain jurisdiction. In case the intangibles are valued at the costs of creation and
maintenance, the intangibles would be located where the majority of the creation
and maintenance activities takes place. For example, in case of R&D, this would
be the jurisdiction where the biggest part of R&D is conducted. Whereas this
approach may fit well in cases of creating an intangible by means of R&D, the
valuation and location may not be that clear in case of other intangible assets,
such as trademarks, whose value is driven by various factors.152 Whatever factor
is used for valuation, due to ICT, it is difficult to separate the respective
contributions performed in different jurisdiction.
It has to be noticed that an inclusion of the intangibles in the formula increases
the risk of manipulation. As intangible assets are generally mobile and as their
location cannot readily be determined – especially from the perspective of the
tax administration –, intangibles can quite easily be relocated to low tax
countries solely for tax purposes.153 To summarise, compared to the separate
entity approach, intangible property again constitutes the main problem that has
to be addressed. As the importance of intangibles is deemed to increase further,
the issues related to intangibles will also become even more important.154 
Payroll Factor
The payroll factor accounts for the contribution of labour to the generation of
income. The principle of inter-nation equity demands that all relevant sources of
the generation of income are included in the apportionment formula. Thus, due
to the increased importance of human capital as an income-producing factor, it
gets even more necessary to include the payroll factor in the formula. 
In the current practice of the United States, “payroll” includes all kinds of
compensation paid to employees, such as salaries, commissions, and bonuses.155
As these figures can be determined quite easily, the valuation of the payroll
factor is deemed to be feasible. However, the problem immanent in the payroll
                                                                                                                                   
shall be calculated on a cumulative basis, not on current expenditure. See McLure, 1997: 869.
151 See OECD, 2001: 6.27. For more details regarding the R&D-example, see McLure, 1997: 866.
152 See OECD, 2001: 6.4; McLure, 1997: 867.
153 See also OECD, 2001: 3.65; McLure, 1989: 245.
154 In case the feasibility issues of including intangibles in the property factor cannot be solved,
intangibles might be considered in the payroll factor, as a main part of the value of intangibles is
created by human capital. See also the discussion in McLure, 1997: 865.
155 See Multistate Tax Commission, 2001: Reg. IV.13.(a); McLure and Martens Weiner, 2000: 270.
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factor is that it is based on the assumption of equal productivity of labour in all
jurisdictions, whereas, in practice, the wage levels of the various countries
differ. Due to the increased mobility of companies, the difference in the wage
levels may be used even more intensively nowadays. Even if the alternative of
calculating the labour costs per product unit is deemed to be more reasonable, it
does not seem to be workable in practice.156 The aforementioned valuation
problems could be avoided by using the number of employees instead of payroll.
However, potential distortions may occur, as the employees’ wages may differ
significantly. Consequently, for the time being, the above-mentioned definition
of payroll is the relatively best alternative in terms of feasibility. 
Besides, the “location” of payroll has to be determined. According to the current
practice in the United States, the payroll is assigned to a country if the majority
of the employee’s services are performed within the jurisdiction. Thus, a
localisation of payroll is in most cases possible. If services are performed in
several states, which may often be the case due to ICT, a kind of a tie-breaker
rule is applied. The payroll is attributed to the state in which a part of the
services is performed and where the employee’s base of operations is located,
where the services are directed or controlled or where the employee’s residence
is located.157 This tie-breaker rule is deemed to be reasonable, as in the end
stable criteria are used to locate the services performed. 
Consequently, as the payroll factor is feasible in practice, it is the least
controversial of all three factors.158 The Workshop on the Experimental
Application of “Home State Taxation” to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
in the EU recommended to use payroll as the sole factor, if a simple formula is
sought to allocate profits between the Member States.159 Also in Germany, the
payroll factor currently constitutes the only factor used.160 However, a formula
based solely on payroll may entail problems in case a company has a nexus, for
example a permanent establishment, in a certain jurisdiction, but no employees
who are working there. This may be the case if a server is maintained in a
certain country without any company staff.161 Then, no tax revenues would be
attributed to this jurisdiction by a mere payroll formula, although the company
generates profits through this fixed nexus. However, these cases are rather
seldom and the amount of profits generated in such a permanent establishment is
deemed to be not that high. To sum up, the payroll factor shall constitute a factor
in the apportionment formula, as its inclusion is feasible and consistent with
inter-nation equity.
As regards the manipulation of the three factors, the incentive to manipulation
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exists primarily in case of taxation according to the source principle. Thus, the
same effect occurs as in the case of manipulation of the ALP.162 If all countries
apply the same formula, no double taxation occurs. Otherwise, a double taxation
or an under-taxation results.163 Again, an agreement procedure would then be
necessary to ensure a one-time taxation of the companies’ profits. Consequently,
every participating jurisdiction should use the same formula when implementing
FA.164 However, a standard apportionment formula may produce an arbitrary
apportionment or even inequities.165 As the factors of production vary in
importance for different industries, it has to be further analysed whether
different formulae for different industries are preferable regarding the tax
principles.166 Besides, it has to be examined in more detail which effects
different formulae have on the distribution of income between the
jurisdictions.167 In addition, it is questionable whether all profits shall be
allocated according to FA or, for example, only those profits which cannot be
allocated according to the ALP.168
5.3.4. Interim Result and Comparison to the Arm’s Length Principle
Inter-Nation Equity
Regarding the principle of inter-nation equity, a fundamental difference between
the two approaches can be noticed. On the one hand, it has been shown that the
ALP can only comply with the principle of inter-nation equity if transactions are
conducted under market conditions. Otherwise, the basic essentials of affiliated
groups are not considered and, consequently, the allocation of profits cannot be
carried out according to the source of profits. As perfect market conditions are
less likely to be found, the ALP can guarantee inter-nation equity less often. On
the other hand, the unitary method in combination with FA takes into account
the fact that several legal entities form an economic entity and it is not based on
comparability. The essentials of groups of companies, such as economies of
scope, are considered. This implies that FA has the potential to allocate profits
in accordance with inter-nation equity. As a consequence, in contrast to the
ALP, the unitary method combined with FA is based on a methodically right
approach. However, in case of implementing FA in practice, the regulations
regarding the scope of a unitary business as well as the apportionment formula
have to be consistent with inter-nation equity in order to comply with this
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principle in practice. To conclude, if no perfect market conditions within a MNG
exist, the unitary method is preferable to the ALP in the light of the principle of
inter-nation equity.169
Feasibility
Concerning the feasibility in general, in practice, the ALP is in many cases not
workable. Regarding the implementation of FA, its feasibility depends on the
design of the formula as well as on the definition of a unitary business. If the
above-mentioned proposals regarding these two aspects were considered, a
feasible solution could be reached. Besides, the general feasibility of the unitary
method in combination with FA depends on the fact whether it is politically
realisable. The implementation of FA would require a high degree of co-
operation between the participating jurisdictions.170 As regards the ALP, this
political consensus has already been reached. To conclude, it depends on several
aspects whether FA is more feasible than the ALP. However, once the system of
FA is implemented, it seems to be more feasible than the ALP, as it does not
contain so many cases in which it is not workable. 
Regarding the incentive to manipulation, it has been shown above that the
separate entity approach in combination with the ALP gives the incentive to
shift profits to low tax countries by use of transfer pricing. However, also a FA
approach based on intangible property and sales may entail the incentive to
manipulation. Thus, the unitary method in combination with FA does not
constitute an overall remedy for the issues of profit shifting inherent in the ALP.
As the degree of incentives to manipulate depends on the respective kind of
implementation, it cannot generally be determined which of the two concepts is
more susceptible to manipulation. However, especially in case the FA method is
based on payroll, the opportunities for manipulating the tax base occur less
frequently. For both concepts, it has to be noticed that the incentive to
manipulation depends on whether the residence or the source principle applies. 
As regards the cost-effectiveness of the two concepts, it can be stated that the
ALP turned out to be cost-intensive, as, especially due to ICT, it creates high
costs for the taxpayer as well as for the tax administration. Also the method of
FA may be cost-intensive, as, for example, the determination of a company’s
property may be complex and may require a relatively high effort.171 Again, it
depends on the kind of apportionment formula whether FA is less cost-intensive.
However, the FA approach does not have to cope with such a high quantity of
separate transactions. Thus, even if precise figures are difficult to quantify, FA
seems to be more cost-effective than the ALP. 
Besides, a double taxation of profits occurs in case of taxation according to the
ALP if transfer prices are adjusted by only one jurisdiction. Then, double
taxation can be prevented by the EU tax arbitration convention. In case of FA,
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double taxation occurs if the participating countries do not all apply the same
formula. Consequently, it depends on these conditions whether the risk of
double taxation is higher in case of FA than in case of an application of the
ALP. 
To conclude, it can be stated that FA is not a cure for all the problems inherent
in the ALP. It seems as if both concepts have to cope with the same issues:
While the ALP is criticised regarding its inability to cope with intangibles,
comparable issues arise with the FA approach, although to a minor degree.172
Thus, the problems are shifted from the determination of transfer pricing to the
determination of the factors in the formula.173 In case transactions are conducted
under market conditions, the ALP is still applicable, but the number of those
cases is decreasing due to ICT. In the light of the two required tax principles, it
seems that the FA approach can better cope with the economic structures
changed by ICT, especially if the recommendations regarding its
implementation are considered. As a consequence, to conclude, FA shall be
preferred regarding the special issues of the changed economic structures.174
This is especially valid when considering future developments, because the
impact of ICT on the economy is supposed to further increase. 
5.3.5. Formula Apportionment in the European Union
Especially for the EU, the implementation of a harmonised FA approach can
represent a suitable alternative of profit allocation within MNGs. This is due to
the widespread use of ICT across Europe as well as to the ongoing European
integration regarding economic and financial markets. The number of MNGs
within the EU is quite high and a lot of intragroup cross-border transactions are
taking place. Up to now, this level of integration has not been achieved in the
field of taxation. Currently, 15 different company tax systems are coexistent –
and soon, there will even be 25 national tax systems. As a consequence, the
aforementioned issues of the ALP regarding the ICT-induced organisational
changes are raised to a great extent and it is worth considering the
implementation of FA in the EU. 
In a study issued by the European Commission in 2001 regarding company
taxation in the Internal Market, transfer pricing issues turned out to be one of the
main current tax obstacles in the EU. Based on these results, the European
Commission has made different suggestions of reforming and harmonising
company taxation in the EU which are all based on an indirect approach of profit
allocation.175 The concept with the lowest level of harmonisation is the concept
of Home State Taxation (HST). Pursuant to this approach, MNGs compute their
taxable base according to only one single tax system, the tax code of their home
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state. The Member States administrations accept, under a form of mutual
recognition, the tax codes of the other Member States. A second proposal
consists in a Common Consolidated Base Taxation (CCBT). The difference
compared to HST lies in the fact that the tax base of the MNGs is calculated
according to an optional new code which is adopted across the whole EU. Thus,
the Member States agree on a set of common rules. In both concepts, the tax rate
is set by the individual Member States. The third approach is the so-called
European Union Company Income Tax (EUCIT), which requires the draft of a
new, single corporate tax code with a single tax rate to be applied across the EU.
Thus, Member States have to give up an element of their fiscal sovereignty. The
forth suggestion of the European Commission consists in a Single Compulsory
Harmonised Tax Base (CHTB). According to this approach, a single corporate
tax code would replace the existing 15 or 25 domestic tax codes and would be
applied to all enterprises within the EU.
In order to assess the approaches according to their appropriateness, in general,
the implications deduced above regarding the implementation of the unitary
method combined with FA are again valid. In case of all four concepts, the
problems concerning transfer pricing can be resolved, as the method of separate
accounting is replaced by an indirect method of profit allocation.176 The issues
of manipulation and double taxation can be reduced as well.177 Besides, the
compliance costs can be decreased, as the enterprises mainly have to deal with
only one tax code. However, differences exist: Under the concept of HST, no
additional tax system has to be introduced, whereas in case of the other
concepts, the costs for the tax administration may even increase due to the
operation of two tax codes.178 Furthermore, the concepts differ regarding the
feasibility of a political consensus: A mutual recognition may be easier to
achieve than a harmonisation of the different tax codes. Especially for the
EUCIT and the CHTB, a political consensus is hard to achieve, as individual
Member States are not supposed to give up their fiscal sovereignty easily.179 
As regards the scope of the unitary business, the concepts differ concerning the
level of harmonisation. The HST approach is based on the definition of a unitary
business in the home state. Thus, differing definitions of the unitary business
might lead to inconsistencies and double taxation. The other three concepts are
based on an Europe-wide definition of the unitary business. They are deemed to
be preferable, as they allow for a new, uniform European definition of the
unitary business which can comply with the tax principles. 
Concerning the revenue allocation, the European Commission has suggested
three different methods of apportioning the income: FA or an allocation
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according to the value added as two forms of allocating profits on a micro level,
and an allocation on the macro level, i.e. based on economic data at the level of
the Member States.180 Generally, there is no difference between the four
concepts concerning the apportionment of profits. As regards the method of FA,
the results outlined above are again valid. Within the EU, the incentive to
manipulate the factors could be lowered to a certain extent by imposing
minimum and maximum rates in order to limit the spread between the tax
rates.181 Besides, an allocation according to the value added may constitute an
alternative. The necessary data is already recorded and collected within the EU
for value added tax purposes. It is presumed that it is more difficult to
manipulate an apportionment based on the value added and that it is easier to
detect.182
There are some other general caveats concerning the implementation of FA in
the EU which still require further research. For example, it has to be clarified
how the allocation of profits between Member States and third countries should
be organised.183 Besides, an agreement regarding the basic rules for a uniform
tax base has to be achieved. Here, the set of International Accounting Standards
may serve as a common basis which has to be modified adequately for tax
purposes.184 
To conclude, the concepts suggested by the European Commission are
considered to be a good starting point for reforming the company taxation in
Europe, as they are based on the indirect method of profit allocation which
turned out to be more suitable in case of the specific ICT-induced changes
within the organisational structures of MNGs. Regarding the differences
between the approaches, further research is still necessary which one is
preferable from an economic point of view and, at the same time, can be
implemented in practice from a political point of view. In general, the more
likely a political consensus for an approach can be achieved, the less preferable
it is under economic aspects.185 Perhaps the CCBT can constitute the alternative
that complies best with these two requirements in a medium-turn. All in all, it
seems that FA has a promising future for company taxation in the EU. 
6. Conclusions 
(1) The use of ICT within the economy leads to a rising number of cross-
border transactions. At the same time, transactions and the organisational
structures of companies become more and more specific and, thus, less
comparable. The importance of human capital and of mobile factors of
production, such as intangible assets, increases. Besides, different forms of
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enterprise co-operation emerge. The contribution of each entity to the value
added is often hard to identify.
(2) The ALP can only comply with the principle of inter-nation equity if
intragroup transactions are conducted under market conditions. Due to the
use of ICT, these cases exist less often. This is valid for traditional
transaction methods as well as for transactional profit methods.
(3) The ALP encounters difficulties regarding the feasibility in practice, as
comparable transactions necessary for its implementation exist less often.
Besides, it tends to be cost-intensive and entails the incentive to
manipulation. In addition, a double taxation of profits can occur under the
ALP. Possible adjustments, such as APAs or transactional profit methods,
can mitigate the feasibility issues only to a limited degree. 
(4) When considering FA as an alternative, it cannot be recommended to
include the sales factor in the formula. As regards the consideration of the
property factor, especially intangible assets shall be included, provided that
their identification and valuation is possible. Besides, the payroll factor is
considered a suitable element of the formula. The scope of a unitary
business shall in theory be defined according to economic criteria. If they
do not provide certainty in practice, legal criteria should be used. 
(5) As regards the special issues of the changed economic structures due to
ICT, the FA approach – on the basis of the above-mentioned
recommendations – is preferable over the ALP in the light of the principle
of inter-nation equity. This is due to the fact that the unitary method in
combination with FA takes into account the essentials of an economic
entity and can provide for an allocation according to the source of profits.
Besides, FA tends to be more feasible than the ALP approach, as it is not
based on separate comparable transactions. Thus, it is deemed to be more
cost-effective and less susceptible to manipulation. However, the political
consensus necessary for an implementation of FA may be hard to achieve.
(6) Based on this outcome, FA may constitute a suitable alternative of profit
allocation especially for the EU. For this purpose, the proposals made by
the European Commission are considered to be a good starting point. Still
further research is necessary in order to decide which concept shall be
preferred from an economic as well as a political point of view. 
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